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Abstract—In this letter, as a proof of concept, we propose a
deep learning-based approach to attack the chaos-based image
encryption algorithm in [1]. The proposed method first projects
the chaos-based encrypted images into the low-dimensional
feature space, where essential information of plain images has
been largely preserved. With the low-dimensional features, a
deconvolutional generator is utilized to regenerate perceptually
similar decrypted images to approximate the plain images in the
high-dimensional space. Compared with conventional image en-
cryption attack algorithms, the proposed method does not require
to manually analyze and infer keys in a time-consuming way.
Instead, we directly attack the chaos-based encryption algorithms
in a key-independent manner. Moreover, the proposed method
can be trained end-to-end. Given the chaos-based encrypted
images, a well-trained decryption model is able to automatically
reconstruct plain images with high fidelity. In the experiments,
we successfully attack the chaos-based algorithm [1] and the
decrypted images are visually similar to their ground truth plain
images. Experimental results on both static-key and dynamic-key
scenarios verify the efficacy of the proposed method.
Index Terms—chaos-based encryption, image decryption, deep
learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
A series of characteristics of chaotic systems such as
pseudo-random characteristics, unpredictability of orbit, sen-
sitivity to initial state and control parameters are in good
agreement with many requirements of cryptography, so chaotic
cryptography has been extensively studied. Whit this, a chaos-
based image encryption algorithm was proposed in [1]. The
algorithm combines confusion and diffusion in traditional
cryptography, which utilizes Arnold’s cat map [2] to shuffle
the positions of plain-image pixels to introduce diffusion and
Chen’s chaotic system [3] to change the grayscale values of
the shuffled image pixels to introduce confusion, the combined
transformation of confusion and diffusion provides greater
security than using them separately.
In order to ensure the security level of the encryption
algorithm, the researchers also continue to analyze the vul-
nerabilities of various encryption schemes and try to attack
them. Among them, a traditional method is to infer the key
by manually analyzing the encryption algorithm, just like the
solution in [4], the authors demonstrated a chosen-plaintext
attack and a known-plaintext attack that reveals the secret
parameters of the encryption algorithms in [1], however this
method is key-dependent and relatively time-consuming and
labor intensive. Another approach is to search for keys from
a key dictionary maintained with some special algorithms.
For instance, in [5] a key dictionary was constructed by
using machine learning algorithms to generate more human-
compliant keys, the attacker constantly searches through the
key dictionary until the correct one is found, but in addition
to being time consuming, this solution has a great chance of
not finding the right key.
In this letter, a novel image decryption approach is proposed
to attack the chaos-based image encryption algorithm [1] based
on deep learning. As proof of concept, we first proposed
to use the deep learning method to crack the encryption
algorithm. First, we extract essential features from cipher-
images with a convolutional encoder architecture. Then we
regenerate decrypted images from the features to approximate
their corresponding plain images with a symmetric deconvo-
lutional generator network. Experimental results demonstrate
the effectiveness of the proposed method both for cracking the
proposal [1] in both static-key and dynamic-key encryption
cases. Compared to previous encrypted image attack schemes
[4], [5], our method does not require a time-consuming
manual analysis of the algorithm to infer the key. Instead, we
directly attack the chaotic-based encryption algorithm in a key-
independent manner. After training the decryption model, the
well-trained model can quickly and automatically reconstruct
the plain image from the encrypted image with high fidelity.
II. THE CHAOS-BASED IMAGE ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM
There are two steps in the chaos-based image encryption
algorithm [1] : first, the positions of image pixels in the plain
images are shuffled using Arnold’s cat map [2]. Then, the
grayscale values of the shuffled image pixels are changed using
Chen’s chaotic system [3].
A. Arnold’s cat map
Arnold’s cat map [2] is a chaotic mapping method for re-
peated folding and stretching transformation in a finite region,
which is generally applied to multimedia chaotic encryption.
Without loss of generality, assume that we have an original
grayscale image P of size N × N with pixel coordinates
S = {(x, y)|x, y = 0, 1, 2, ..., N − 1}. Arnold’s cat map can
be expressed as,[
x′
y′
]
= A
[
x
y
]
(modN) =
[
1 p
q pq + 1
] [
x
y
]
(modN) , (1)
where p and q are positive integers. (x′, y′) is the new
coordinate value of the original pixel (x, y) after iterating the
map once. After Arnold’s cat map has been performed for n
times, we have,[
x′
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]
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where
M =
[
m1 m2
m3 m4
]
= An (modN) . (3)
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the proposed deep learning-based image decryption scheme for the chaos-based image encryption method [1]. The proposed method
enables end-to-end relationship inference between plain images and chao-based encrypted images. The decryption model can be divided into two parts: the
first part is to project cipher images into the low-dimensional feature space with a convolutional encoder, and the second part is to regenerate the decrypted
image with a deconvolutional generator.
B. Chen’s chaotic system
In Chen’s chaotic system [3], there are a set of differential
equations given as, x˙ = a(y − x)y˙ = (c− a)x− xz + cy
z˙ = xy − bz,
(4)
where a, b, and c are parameters. The system is chaotic when
a = 35, b = 3 and c ∈ [20, 28.4] [1], [3].
C. The Chaos-based encryption algorithm
In [1], the secret keys of the encryption algorithm are p, q,
the number of iterations n of Arnold’s cat map and the initial
value of Chen’s chaotic system, i.e., x0, y0, z0. The specific
steps are as follows:
(1) Obtain the shuffled image S by using Arnold’s cat map to
shuffle the image P .
(2) Get a pixels sequence S = {s1, s2, ..., sN×N} by scanning
the shuffled image S in order from left to right and then top
to bottom.
(3) Iterate Chen’s chaotic system N0 = (N ×N)/3 times by
using Runge-Kutta step size 0.001, in each iteration, we can
get three values xi, yi and zi,1 ≤ i ≤ N0, by processing these
values as follows:
k3(i−1)+1 = (|xi| − b|xi|c)× 1014 mod 256,
k3(i−1)+2 = (|yi| − b|yi|c)× 1014 mod 256,
k3(i−1)+3 = (|zi| − b|zi|c)× 1014 mod 256,
(5)
the encryption key sequence K = {k1, k2, ...,KN×N} will
be obtained, where |x| is the absolute value of x. bxc means
round down, it returns the largest integer not larger than x. In
the cryptosystem, all variables have a 15-digit precision when
expressed in scientific notation, so the decimal fractions of the
variables need to be multiplied by 1014.
(4) Encrypt the shuffled sequence S = {s1, s2, ..., sN×N} by:
ci = si ⊕ ki, (6)
where 1 ≤ i ≤ N ×N and ⊕ represents bitwise exclusive OR
operation. So the encrypted sequence C = {c1, c2, ..., cN×N}
is Obtained.
(5) Obtained the cipher-image by reshaping the encrypted
sequence C into an N ×N image.
III. PROPOSED METHOD
To attack the chaos-based image encryption algorithm [1],
we need to find a complex mapping function to model the
inverse transform from encrypted images and plain images.
We employ deep convolutional neural networks (CNN) [6],
[7] to model such complex inverse functions [8], [9].
In Fig.1, the model is mainly divided into convolutional
groups and deconvolutional groups. In convolutional groups,
the input are the cipher images described as X, we design
several convolutional layers to analyze input image composi-
tion and obtain the low-dimensional features, the operation is
defined as Y = O(X). In deconvolutional groups, we perform
the opposite operation to the convolution stage and reconstruct
plain images with high fidelity. The inverting operation is
described as X˜ = H(Y). The regenerate images are compared
to their ground truth plain images given as target T, we use
Mean Squared Error (MSE) as the loss function [10]–[13].
After training, the model can be used to attack the chaos-based
image encryption algorithms [1].
A. Network Architecture
As shown in Fig.2, on the left is the convolutional groups
and the deconvolutional network is on right, they are basically
symmetrical.
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Fig. 2. The network structure of the deep learning-based model, which is
also mainly composed of the convolutional groups and deconvolution groups.
The former mainly includes 6 convolution layers and the latter mainly has 6
deconvolution layers.
3In convolutional groups 1 to 5, in order to ensure that
the information at the edge of the image can be utilized,
one-dimensional zero padding [6] is first applied around the
input image. Then the padded image is convolved with a
convolutional layer (4× 4 kernel size, 2× 2 stride). Next, we
perform BatchNormalization on the output [14]. Finally
the output is put through the relu [15] function described
as relu(x) = max(0, x), introducing non-linear factors to
neurons. In convolutional group 6, we only construct a con-
volutional layer (4× 4 kernel size, 1× 1 stride) and activation
function σ(x) = 1/(1 + e−x) [6].
In the convolutional groups above, except that the number
of output feature maps of the convolutional layer in the first
group is 32, the output of other convolutional layers is twice
that of the corresponding input feature map number. For each
i(1 ≤ i ≤ 6) of the groups, the convolutional operation oi is
given by
oi(X) =

X, i = 0
relu(q(oi−1(X)⊗Wi + bi)), 1 ≤ i ≤ 5
σ(oi−1(X)⊗Wi + bi), i = 6,
(7)
where Wi and bi denote the weights and biases of con-
volutional filters, respectively. ⊗ represents the convolution
operator and q represents BatchNormalization.
For the convolutional groups, there are six deconvolutional
groups. The first deconvolutional group includes a decon-
volutional layer (4 × 4 kernel size, 1 × 1 stride) followed
by a BatchNormalization layer and a relu function. In
deconvolutional groups 2 to 6, we design a deconvolutional
layer (4 × 4 kernel size, 2 × 2 stride) with one-dimensional
zero padding, followed by a BatchNormalization layer and
relu function except group 6.
In the above deconvolutional groups, the number of output
feature maps for the deconvolution layer in the last group
is one, while the number of output feature maps for other
deconvolution layers is half of the corresponding input. For
a single group k(1 ≤ k ≤ 6), given the deconvolution
operator , deconvolutional filter weights W˜k and biases b˜k,
the deconvolutional operation hk is described as
hk(Y) =

Y, k = 0
relu(q(hk−1(Y) W˜k + b˜k)), 1 ≤ k ≤ 5
hk−1(Y) W˜k + b˜k, k = 6.
(8)
In the network designed above, the reason for using the
convolution layer instead of the downsampling layer when
projecting input into a low-dimensional space is that the down-
sampling layer loses more original information. In addition,
the 4 × 4 convolution kernel size is used to simply and
efficiently project the input into the low-dimensional space
and to ensure the symmetry of the projected and reconstructed
plain image.
B. Network Training
In order to model the inverse transform H(O(X)) from
encrypted images and plain images, we will minimize the
distance between the output of the network and the plain
images T corresponds to the input cipher images X by
using MSE. In addition, we introduce the regularization of
weight decay to help for a better generalization in order to
avoid overfitting [16]–[18]. Given the regularization weighting
coefficients α = 0.01, we have loss function
L(W,b) = ‖T−H(O(X))‖22 + α ‖W‖22 , (9)
where 
W =
∑
i
Wi +
∑
k
W˜K
b =
∑
i
bi +
∑
k
b˜K .
(10)
After defining the loss function, we use the Adam [19]
optimization method to train it. While iteratively inputting
each data batch (batch size = 64), the filter is updated in the
direction that minimizes the loss function. We set the initial
learning rate to 0.001, and the coefficients used for computing
running averages of gradient and its square is (0.9, 0.999).
IV. EXPERIMENTS
A. Cracking of images encrypted with static-keys
In the static-key case, the MNIST dataset is used for training
and cracking evaluations. In detail, we use 60, 000 plain
images from the training set of the MNIST dataset, and the
rest 10, 000 plain images from the test set. The precision is set
as 10−14 when encrypting plain images using the chaos-based
image encryption algorithm [1]. The secret keys of Arnold’s
cat map are chosen as: p = 4, q = 7, n = 5; the parameters of
Chen’s chaotic system are selected as: a = 35, b = 3, c = 28.
And the initial condition of Chen’s system is: x0 = −10.058,
y0 = 0.368, z0 = 37.368. For details of selecting the secret
parameters, please refer to [1]. Next we resize all images into
128 × 128 pixels and store in PNG format. Finally, we use
the resulting images (i.e., 60, 000 pairs of cipher-plain images)
from the training set to train the network. To test the decryption
performance, we feed the encrypted images from the test set
(i.e., 10, 000 encrypted images) to the well-trained network.
In Fig. 3, we show several decryption representatives. The
top row shows ten plain digits which were randomly selected
from the MNIST ten-digit categories. Corresponding to each
digit sample in the first row, their cipher and regenerated
images are shown in the second and the third row, respectively.
In the second row, we find each digit has been randomly
largely shuffled and changed with the chaos-based encryption
[1]. Comparing the regenerated images with the cipher images,
we observe that the regenerated images mostly restored the
content information of their plain images. One could clearly
tell the digit number represented by each regenerated image.
B. Cracking of images encrypted with dynamic-keys
In this experiment, we evaluate the image cracking perfor-
mance in the dynamic-key setting. Specifically, we change the
selection of secret parameters of Arnold’s cat map by setting
p and q from a range 1 to 9. During encryption process, p
and q will randomly select the parameters within this given
range. All other secret keys settings remain the same as the
static-key experimental settings in subsection IV-A. In order to
4Fig. 3. Cracking of images encrypted with static keys. From the top to
bottom are the plain-images, cipher-images and regenerate images, and the
regenerate images have a very high degree of reduction on the plain-images,
we can clearly distinguish each number.
Fig. 4. Cracking result of images encrypted with dynamic-keys. From the
top to bottom are the plain-images, cipher-images and regenerate images,
and regenerate-images still restores most of the information in the plain-
images, and we could easily distinguish the numbers on each image, except
for individual numbers such as 2.
increase the coverage of our network for different encryption
transformation methods due to distinct keys, we encrypted
each sample of the MNIST training set four times using a set
of dynamic-keys. With this, we have 240, 000 pairs of cipher-
plain images to train the network. Similarly, the test set is
encrypted with dynamic keys, and test results are shown in
Fig. 4.
In the experimental results Fig.4, plain-images, cipher-
images and regenerated images are also arranged in order
from top to bottom. The regenerated images still restore most
essential information of the plain-images but there are also a
few collapsed results, e.g., the restored image of the number 2
in the Fig.4. Despite several failed cases, we could still easily
distinguish the numbers on the images except these individual
examples.
V. EVALUATIONS
A. Quantitative Evaluations
In order to measure the quality of our experimental results,
we introduce the LeNet − 5 network [20] to classify and
evaluate the results, because the LeNet − 5 network can
classify MNIST data sets with high precision, its accuracy
on the MNIST test set can reach 99.05%, and its structure
is relatively simple, so it is very efficient to use it as an
experimental evaluation. In Evaluations, we first tested the
classification accuracy of LeNet− 5 on the original MNIST
test set, and then used it to evaluate the performance of our
decrypted images. Table I shows the classification accuracy
rates of LeNet − 5 network on MNIST test set and our
experimental results. Among them, the accuracy rate on the
original MNIST test dataset is 98.77%, which indicates the
efficiency of LeNet− 5 for the MNIST digit recognition. To
quantitatively test the accuracy of our pre-trained decryption
model, firstly we encrypt the MNIST test dataset using the
chaos-based encryption [1] in the static-key encryption sce-
nario. Then the encrypted MNIST digits are decrypted using
our pre-trained model to approximately decrypt plain images.
Finally, the decrypted images are recognized by the LeNet−5
model. The accuracy is calculated by comparing the predicted
label from decrypted images with ground truth label from their
plain image counterparts. The recognition accuracy is 97.87%,
which is only slightly lower than that on the plain images.
This means that decrypted images can be recognized quite
well. Similarly, we test the recognition accuracy of decrypted
images from the dynamic-key encryption. As showed in Table
I, the accuracy rate is 92.04%. From the recognition results,
we conclude that the proposed image decryption method can
efficiently crack the chaos-based image encryption methods
[1].
TABLE I
CLASSIFICATION ACCURACY RATES OF LENET-5
Image Set Encryption Encryption Classificationcase accuracy rates
origin MNIST no none 98.77%
decrypted MNIST yes static-key 97.87%
decrypted MNIST yes dynamic-key 92.04%
B. Comparison
The attack method proposed in [4] is a process of man-
ually analyzing the encryption algorithm [1]. Among them,
the chosen-plaintext attack requires constructing a specific
plaintext input into the encryption algorithm [1], but many
times there is no such condition. In contrast, our approach
does not require specific inputs. And for the known-plaintext
attack in [4], the secret parameter extraction of Arnold’s cat
map is a process of continuously narrowing the scope of
encryption transformation, the attacker needs to constantly find
out all the possible encryption transformation methods until
the final private parameters are found, which is an extremely
time-consuming and labor-intensive process. In comparison,
our method has the following advantages. The decryption
method in [4] needs to be calculated separately for each crack.
However, our method does not require to crack the keys
before decryption, which is key-independent. For instance,
in the dynamic-key encryption case,it only requires to be
trained once to automatically decrypt MNIST digits encrypted
with different keys. The experimental results confirm that the
proposed method has certain degree of generalization ability.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this letter, we first present a new attack method based on
deep learning for a chaos-based image encryption algorithm
[1]. The proposed method first projects encrypted images to
the low-dimensional feature space. Then decrypted images are
perceptually reconstructed with the deconvolutional generator.
Experimental results verify the decryption accuracy of the
proposed method in both static-key and dynamic-key encryp-
tion cases. Compared with the previous method, our solution
is key-independent and automatical. In the future work, we
will explore the feasibility of decrypting chaos-based video
encryption and other image encryption schemes.
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